Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments

Cagala T, Glogowsky U, Rincke J, Schudy S (2024)

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2024

Journal

Games and Economic Behavior Elsevier

Book Volume: 143

Pages Range: 179-190

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.014

Abstract

Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.

Authors with CRIS profile

Johannes Rincke Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik

Involved external institutions

Deutsche Bundesbank DE Germany (DE) Johannes Kepler Universität (JKU) Linz AT Austria (AT) Universität Ulm DE Germany (DE)

How to cite

APA:

Cagala, T., Glogowsky, U., Rincke, J., & Schudy, S. (2024). Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 143, 179-190. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.014

MLA:

Cagala, Tobias, et al. "Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments." Games and Economic Behavior 143 (2024): 179-190.

BibTeX: Download