Cagala T, Glogowsky U, Rincke J, Schudy S (2024)
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2024
Book Volume: 143
Pages Range: 179-190
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.014
Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.
APA:
Cagala, T., Glogowsky, U., Rincke, J., & Schudy, S. (2024). Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 143, 179-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.014
MLA:
Cagala, Tobias, et al. "Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments." Games and Economic Behavior 143 (2024): 179-190.
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