On a tractable single-level reformulation of a multilevel model of the European entry-exit gas market with market power

Grimm V, Grübel J, Schmidt M, Schwartz A, Wiertz AK, Zöttl G (2025)


Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2025

Journal

Book Volume: 91

Pages Range: 953-985

Journal Issue: 4

DOI: 10.1007/s10898-025-01475-8

Abstract

We propose a framework that allows to quantitatively analyze the interplay of the different agents involved in gas trade and transport in the context of the European entry-exit system. Previous contributions have focused on the case of perfectly competitive buyers and sellers of gas, which allows to replace the respective market equilibrium problem by a single welfare maximization problem. Our novel framework considers the mathematically more challenging case of a monopolistic and thus strategic gas seller. In this framework, the objective functions of the gas sellers and buyers cannot be aggregated into a common objective function, which is why a multilevel formulation is necessary to accurately capture the sequential nature of the decisions taken. For this setup, we derive sufficient conditions that allow for reformulating the challenging four-level model as a computationally tractable single-level reformulation. We prove the correctness of this reformulation and use it for solving several test instances to illustrate the applicability of our approach.

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APA:

Grimm, V., Grübel, J., Schmidt, M., Schwartz, A., Wiertz, A.-K., & Zöttl, G. (2025). On a tractable single-level reformulation of a multilevel model of the European entry-exit gas market with market power. Journal of Global Optimization, 91(4), 953-985. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-025-01475-8

MLA:

Grimm, Veronika, et al. "On a tractable single-level reformulation of a multilevel model of the European entry-exit gas market with market power." Journal of Global Optimization 91.4 (2025): 953-985.

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