Empirical methods in the analysis of collusion
Paha J (2011)
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2011
Journal
Book Volume: 38
Pages Range: 389-415
Journal Issue: 3
DOI: 10.1007/s10663-010-9160-1
Abstract
Regression methods are commonly used in competition lawsuits for, e.g., determining overcharges in price-fixing cases. Technical evaluations of these methods' pros and cons are not necessarily intuitive. Appraisals that are based on case studies are descriptive but need not be universally valid. This paper opens up the black box called econometrics for competition cases. This is done by complementing theoretical arguments with estimation results. These results are obtained for data that is generated by a simulation-model of a collusive industry. Using such data leaves little room for debate about the quality of these methods because estimates of, e. g., overcharges can be compared to their true underlying values. This analysis provides arguments for demonstrating that thoroughly conducted econometric analyses yield better results than simple techniques such as before-and-after comparisons. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
Involved external institutions
Germany (DE)How to cite
APA:
Paha, J. (2011). Empirical methods in the analysis of collusion. Empirica, 38(3), 389-415. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10663-010-9160-1
MLA:
Paha, Johannes. "Empirical methods in the analysis of collusion." Empirica 38.3 (2011): 389-415.
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