Jain N, Lydersen L, Wittmann C, Wiechers C, Elser D, Marquardt C, Makarov V, Leuchs G (2011)
Publication Type: Conference contribution
Publication year: 2011
Conference Proceedings Title: 2011 Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics Europe and 12th European Quantum Electronics Conference, CLEO EUROPE/EQEC 2011
Event location: DEU
ISBN: 9781457705335
DOI: 10.1109/CLEOE.2011.5942990
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is poised to be the first widespread implementation of quantum communication. In principle, it offers unconditional security: an eavesdropper introduces errors and thus cannot remain concealed from the legitimate parties. However, in practical implementations the actual security depends on a host of technological and protocol-operational components. Eve could exploit imperfections in Alice's or Bob's equipment (such as source or detectors) remotely, or vulnerabilities in the actual implementation of the abstract QKD protocol. Several such attacks have been proposed [1,2], and various proof-of-principle demonstrations on commercial QKD devices have been performed in recent years [3-5]. © 2011 IEEE.
APA:
Jain, N., Lydersen, L., Wittmann, C., Wiechers, C., Elser, D., Marquardt, C.,... Leuchs, G. (2011). Inducing a detector efficiency mismatch to hack a commercial quantum key distribution system. In 2011 Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics Europe and 12th European Quantum Electronics Conference, CLEO EUROPE/EQEC 2011. DEU.
MLA:
Jain, N., et al. "Inducing a detector efficiency mismatch to hack a commercial quantum key distribution system." Proceedings of the 2011 Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics Europe and 12th European Quantum Electronics Conference, CLEO EUROPE/EQEC 2011, DEU 2011.
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