Freedom of the Will and Rational Abilities

Mayr E (2022)


Publication Type: Book chapter / Article in edited volumes

Publication year: 2022

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V.

Edited Volumes: Powers, Time and Free Will

Series: Synthese Library

Book Volume: 451

Pages Range: 115-135

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_7

Abstract

Since the 1990s, agential capacities and abilities have played an increasingly prominent role in the debate about free will, especially among compatibilists. But it is still not fully clear what precisely compatibilists will gain by relying on capacities and abilities. In this paper, I try to argue that at least for compatibilists of a certain stripe an appeal to abilities is of significant use. These are compatibilists who try to argue for the compatibility of agential freedom and microphysical determinism by distinguishing between different, mutually irreducible levels of explanation (as, e.g., Christian List has recently done). An abilities account of free will provides the grounds for a much-needed principled argument why we can and should disregard certain microphysical features when providing the kind of explanation which is the primary and salient one for explaining intentional actions.

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How to cite

APA:

Mayr, E. (2022). Freedom of the Will and Rational Abilities. In Powers, Time and Free Will. (pp. 115-135). Springer Science and Business Media B.V..

MLA:

Mayr, Erasmus. "Freedom of the Will and Rational Abilities." Powers, Time and Free Will. Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2022. 115-135.

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