Abraham M, Lorek K, Prosch B (2020)
Publication Type: Book chapter / Article in edited volumes
Publication year: 2020
Publisher: De Gruyter
Edited Volumes: Advances in the sociology of trust and cooperation: theory, experiments, and field studies
City/Town: Berlin
Pages Range: 319-334
ISBN: 9783110647495
DOI: 10.1515/9783110647495-014
Cooperatives, which are characterized by pooling of jointly owned and controlled resources in an enterprise by individual actors, are popular and widespread in modern societies. However, since each actor has an incentive to withhold resources individually while benefiting from the common pool, opportunistic behavior may result. One possibility to overcome this dilemma situation are internalized, normative beliefs which foster cooperative behavior. By experimentally modeling dilemma situations, we examine whether normative values work as behavioral reference points for members of cooperatives and whether this enhances cooperation. Our results from two lab experiments demonstrate that a cooperative framework, which we use as an indicator for normative beliefs, produces significantly higher cooperation rates in social dilemma situations. Furthermore, we see that an institution framed as a cooperative is chosen by a substantial share of persons, even if this institution produces inefficient results. Consequently, we conclude that general norms contribute to the cooperative effect of cooperatives.
APA:
Abraham, M., Lorek, K., & Prosch, B. (2020). Social Norms and Commitments in Cooperatives – Experimental Evidence. In Buskens, V., Corten, R., & Snijders, C. (Eds.), Advances in the sociology of trust and cooperation: theory, experiments, and field studies. (pp. 319-334). Berlin: De Gruyter.
MLA:
Abraham, Martin, Kerstin Lorek, and Bernhard Prosch. "Social Norms and Commitments in Cooperatives – Experimental Evidence." Advances in the sociology of trust and cooperation: theory, experiments, and field studies. Ed. Buskens, V., Corten, R., & Snijders, C., Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020. 319-334.
BibTeX: Download