Duopoly price competition of WLAN service providers in presence of heterogeneous user demand
Kumar A, Mallik RK, Schober R (2012)
Publication Type: Conference contribution
Publication year: 2012
Pages Range: 2384-2389
Conference Proceedings Title: IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC
Event location: Shanghai
ISBN: 9781467304375
DOI: 10.1109/WCNC.2012.6214194
Abstract
In the presence of several wireless local area network (WLAN) service providers, the users have to make a choice. The price charged and the congestion experienced by the users play an important role in making this choice. In this paper, we analyze the duopoly price competition between two WLAN service providers in the presence of four types of users. We prove that the distribution of heterogeneous user demand is governed by the Wardrop equilibrium. We also show the existence of the Nash equilibrium between competing WLAN service providers. It is further shown through analysis that the social welfare in Nash equilibrium is close to its maximal value. We find that compared to a strictly regulated monopoly, an unregulated WLAN duopoly market results in significant transfer of the surplus from service providers to users with negligible losses in efficiency. © 2012 IEEE.
Authors with CRIS profile
Involved external institutions
India (IN)
Canada (CA)How to cite
APA:
Kumar, A., Mallik, R.K., & Schober, R. (2012). Duopoly price competition of WLAN service providers in presence of heterogeneous user demand. In IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC (pp. 2384-2389). Shanghai, CN.
MLA:
Kumar, Abhinav, Ranjan K. Mallik, and Robert Schober. "Duopoly price competition of WLAN service providers in presence of heterogeneous user demand." Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2012, Shanghai 2012. 2384-2389.
BibTeX: Download