Zhou X, Choo L (2022)
Publication Language: English
Publication Status: In press
Publication Type: Journal article, Original article
Future Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2022
Publisher: Elsevier
City/Town: European Economic Review
Book Volume: 141
Article Number: 103958
Journal Issue: 103958
URI: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0014292121002464
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103958
We use an experiment to study whether market selection can reduce anomalous behaviour in games. In different treatments, we employ two alternative mechanisms, the random mechanism and the auction mechanism, to allocate the participation rights to the red hat puzzle game, a well-known logical reasoning problem. Compared to the random mechanism, the auction mechanism significantly reduces deviations from the equilibrium play in the red hat puzzle game. Our findings show that under carefully designed incentives, market competition can indeed reduce anomalous behaviour in games.
APA:
Zhou, X., & Choo, L. (2022). Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games? European Economic Review, 141(103958). https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103958
MLA:
Zhou, Xiaoyu, and Lawrence Choo. "Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games?" European Economic Review 141.103958 (2022).
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