Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior

Cagala T, Glogowsky U, Grimm V, Rincke J, Tuset Cueva A (2019)

Publication Language: English

Publication Status: Accepted

Publication Type: Journal article

Future Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2019


Pages Range: 709-723

Journal Issue: 166

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.008

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We present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving to non-profit associations. Holding the price of giving constant, we compare contributions between two conditions: a rent-extraction condition, in which an administrator can expropriate a part of the contributions and a control condition without rent extraction. We find that rent extraction strongly reduces average contributions. Studying the channels through which this effect operates, we demonstrate that rent extraction has situational spillovers, suggesting that it undermines the contributors’ general preference for giving. In contrast, we do not find evidence for negative reciprocity towards the administrator.

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Cagala, T., Glogowsky, U., Grimm, V., Rincke, J., & Tuset Cueva, A. (2019). Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 166, 709-723.


Cagala, Tobias, et al. "Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 166 (2019): 709-723.

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