Does Reciprocity Shape Tax Morale? Evidence from Field-Experimental Variation in Tax Collection Costs

Cagala T, Rincke J, Tuset Cueva A (2019)

Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Other publication type

Publication year: 2019

Abstract

We investigate how administrative efficiency affects tax morale. The context is a

German church tax that builds on voluntary compliance. In a field experiment,

we inform taxpayers about a reduction in collection costs. We find counteracting

effects on compliance, depending on baseline tax morale. High tax morale types

reciprocate cost reductions and increase their tax payments. In contrast, low

tax morale types free-ride on cost reductions and pay even less. We conclude

that reciprocity is a component of tax morale, but less motivated taxpayers are

unlikely to respond positively to improvements in administrative efficiency.

Authors with CRIS profile

Tobias Cagala Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik Johannes Rincke Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik Amanda Tuset Cueva Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik

How to cite

APA:

Cagala, T., Rincke, J., & Tuset Cueva, A. (2019). Does Reciprocity Shape Tax Morale? Evidence from Field-Experimental Variation in Tax Collection Costs.

MLA:

Cagala, Tobias, Johannes Rincke, and Amanda Tuset Cueva. Does Reciprocity Shape Tax Morale? Evidence from Field-Experimental Variation in Tax Collection Costs. 2019.

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