Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models

Merkl C, van Rens T (2019)

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2019


DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2019.01.008


Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in most labor market models all workers have the same probability of being hired. We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. We set up a model that is isomorphic to a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selective hiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but implications for welfare are different for two reasons. First, a hiring externality occurs with random but not with selective hiring. Second, the welfare costs of unemployment are much larger with selective hiring, because unemployment risk is distributed unequally across workers

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Merkl, C., & van Rens, T. (2019). Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models. Labour Economics.


Merkl, Christian, and Thijs van Rens. "Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models." Labour Economics (2019).

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