Implementing efficient market structure

Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E (2003)

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2003


Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)

Book Volume: 7

Pages Range: 443-463

Journal Issue: 4


DOI: 10.1007/s100580300087


This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in
natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior
of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke–Groves mechanism,
characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected
social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms avoid
budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.

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How to cite


Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Implementing efficient market structure. Review of Economic Design, 7(4), 443-463.


Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "Implementing efficient market structure." Review of Economic Design 7.4 (2003): 443-463.

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