Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E (2004)
Publication Type: Book chapter / Article in edited volumes
Publication year: 2004
Publisher: MIT Press
Edited Volumes: Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication
City/Town: Cambridge, MA
Pages Range: 223-246
ISBN: 0-262-09037-6
The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.
APA:
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2004). The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany. In G. Illing (Eds.), Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication. (pp. 223-246). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
MLA:
Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany." Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication. Ed. G. Illing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 223-246.
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