Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner’s dilemma game
Grimm V, Mengel F (2011)
Publication Language: English
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2011
Journal
Publisher: Elsevier
Book Volume: 78
Pages Range: 333-348
Journal Issue: 3
URI: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268111000485
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.018
Abstract
We experimentally investigate the effect of endogenous matching within a segmented population on peoples’ willingness to cooperate as well as their attitudes towards cooperative norms. In the experiment participants can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them a (local) punishment institution fosters cooperation. The degree of population viscosity (i.e. the extent to which matching is biased towards within-group interactions) is varied across treatments. We find that both, the share of participants that choose into the group with the punishment institution and the share of participants that cooperate, increase monotonically with the degree of population viscosity. Furthermore – with higher population viscosity – significantly more subjects claim to support a punishment institution in a post-experimental questionnaire.
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APA:
Grimm, V., & Mengel, F. (2011). Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 78(3), 333-348. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.018
MLA:
Grimm, Veronika, and Friederike Mengel. "Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner’s dilemma game." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 78.3 (2011): 333-348.
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