Information Leakage behind the Curtain: Abusing Anti-EMI Features for Covert Communication

Bauer J, Schinzel S, Freiling F, Dewald A (2016)

Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Conference contribution, Original article

Publication year: 2016

Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

Edited Volumes: Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2016

Pages Range: 130-134

Conference Proceedings Title: Proceedings of HOST 2016

Event location: McLean, VA, USA

ISBN: 9781467388252

DOI: 10.1109/HST.2016.7495570

Abstract

We present a new class of covert channels which can be created by utilizing common hardware but that cannot be detected by such. Our idea is to abuse anti-EMI features of a processor to create a covert channel on the physical layer. Thus, the sender uses the invariants in how digital signals are encoded over analog channels to covertly transport information. This leaked data is present on the wire bound connections of the compromised device, but is also by definition present in the vicinity of the device and can be picked up by radio equipment. As the covert channel is present only on the physical layer, the data on all layers above, as well as the timing behavior on those layers is indistinguishable from uncompromised devices.

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How to cite

APA:

Bauer, J., Schinzel, S., Freiling, F., & Dewald, A. (2016). Information Leakage behind the Curtain: Abusing Anti-EMI Features for Covert Communication. In Proceedings of HOST 2016 (pp. 130-134). McLean, VA, USA: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc..

MLA:

Bauer, Johannes, et al. "Information Leakage behind the Curtain: Abusing Anti-EMI Features for Covert Communication." Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, McLean, VA, USA Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. 130-134.

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