Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement

Grimm V (2007)

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2007


Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)

Book Volume: 90

Pages Range: 1-27

Journal Issue: 1


DOI: 10.1007/s00712-006-0225-3


We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.

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How to cite


Grimm, V. (2007). Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement. Journal of Economics, 90(1), 1-27.


Grimm, Veronika. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement." Journal of Economics 90.1 (2007): 1-27.

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