Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E (2003)
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2003
Publisher: Elsevier
Book Volume: 21
Pages Range: 1557 - 1569
Journal Issue: 10
URI: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718703000584
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00058-4
The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.
APA:
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(10), 1557 - 1569. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00058-4
MLA:
Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany." International Journal of Industrial Organization 21.10 (2003): 1557 - 1569.
BibTeX: Download