Article in Edited Volumes


The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany


Publication Details
Author(s): Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E
Editor(s): G. Illing
Title edited volumes: Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication
Publisher: MIT Press
Publishing place: Cambridge, MA
Publication year: 2004
Pages range: 223-246
ISBN: 0-262-09037-6

Abstract

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.



How to cite
APA: Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2004). The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany. In G. Illing (Eds.), Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication (pp. 223-246). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

MLA: Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "The third generation (UMTS) spectrum license auction in Germany." Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication Ed. G. Illing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 223-246.

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