Journal article


Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences


Publication Details
Author(s): Engelmann D, Grimm V
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Publication year: 2012
Volume: 122
Journal issue: 563
Pages range: 1010-1041
ISSN: 0013-0133

Abstract

In games of conflict, players typically have an incentive to exaggerate their interests. This concerns issues ranging from negotiations between political parties to conflict resolution within marriages. We experimentally study this problem using a simple voting game where information about preferences is private. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences. The exogenous linking mechanism by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains. Repeated interaction in various settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve, leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only when players can choose their partners. © 2012 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2012 Royal Economic Society.



Focus Area of Individual Faculties


How to cite
APA: Engelmann, D., & Grimm, V. (2012). Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences. Economic Journal, 122(563), 1010-1041. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.x

MLA: Engelmann, Dirk, and Veronika Grimm. "Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences." Economic Journal 122.563 (2012): 1010-1041.

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