Journal article


An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment


Publication Details
Author(s): Grimm V, Mengel F
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2012
Volume: 147
Journal issue: 6
Pages range: 2220-2259
ISSN: 0022-0531
Language: English

Abstract

We study how players learn to make decisions if they face many different games. Games are drawn randomly from a set of either two or six games in each of 100 rounds. If either there are few games or if extensive summary information is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case. We demonstrate that there are learning spillovers across games but participants learn to play strategically equivalent games in the same way. Our design and analysis allow us to distinguish between different sources of complexity and theoretical models of categorization. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.



How to cite
APA: Grimm, V., & Mengel, F. (2012). An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(6), 2220-2259. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.011

MLA: Grimm, Veronika, and Friederike Mengel. "An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment." Journal of Economic Theory 147.6 (2012): 2220-2259.

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