Journal article


Implementing efficient market structure


Publication Details
Author(s): Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E
Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Publication year: 2003
Volume: 7
Journal issue: 4
Pages range: 443-463
ISSN: 1434-4742

Abstract

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in
natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior
of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke–Groves mechanism,
characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected
social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms avoid
budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.



Focus Area of Individual Faculties


How to cite
APA: Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Implementing efficient market structure. Review of Economic Design, 7(4), 443-463. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580300087

MLA: Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "Implementing efficient market structure." Review of Economic Design 7.4 (2003): 443-463.

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