Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany.

Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E (2003)


Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2003

Journal

Publisher: Elsevier

Book Volume: 21

Pages Range: 1557 - 1569

Journal Issue: 10

URI: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718703000584

DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00058-4

Abstract

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.

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How to cite

APA:

Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(10), 1557 - 1569. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00058-4

MLA:

Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany." International Journal of Industrial Organization 21.10 (2003): 1557 - 1569.

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