Journal article


Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany.


Publication Details
Author(s): Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2003
Volume: 21
Journal issue: 10
Pages range: 1557 - 1569
ISSN: 0167-7187

Abstract

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.



How to cite
APA: Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(10), 1557 - 1569. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00058-4

MLA: Grimm, Veronika, Frank Riedel, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany." International Journal of Industrial Organization 21.10 (2003): 1557 - 1569.

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