Journal article


Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement


Publication Details
Author(s): Grimm V
Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Publication year: 2007
Volume: 90
Journal issue: 1
Pages range: 1-27
ISSN: 0931-8658

Abstract

We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.



How to cite
APA: Grimm, V. (2007). Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement. Journal of Economics, 90(1), 1-27. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0225-3

MLA: Grimm, Veronika. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement." Journal of Economics 90.1 (2007): 1-27.

BibTeX: Download
Share link
Last updated on 2017-11-20 at 01:36
PDF downloaded successfully