Journal article


Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions – An Experimental Investigation


Publication Details
Author(s): Engelmann D, Grimm V
Publisher: Wiley-VCH Verlag
Publication year: 2009
Volume: 119
Journal issue: 537
Pages range: 855-882
ISSN: 0013-0133

Abstract

We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.



How to cite
APA: Engelmann, D., & Grimm, V. (2009). Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions – An Experimental Investigation. The Economic Journal, 119(537), 855-882. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02249.x

MLA: Engelmann, Dirk, and Veronika Grimm. "Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions – An Experimental Investigation." The Economic Journal 119.537 (2009): 855-882.

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