Journal article
(Original article)


Sellars and Quine on Empiricism and Conceptual Truth


Publication Details
Author(s): Brandt S
Publication year: 2016
ISSN: 0960-8788
Language: English

Abstract

I compare Sellars’s criticism of the ‘myth of the given’ with Quine’s criticism of the ‘two dogmas’ of empiricism, that is, the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism. In Sections I to III, I present Quine’s and Sellars’s views. In IV to X, I discuss similarities and differences in their views. In XI to XII, I show that Sellars’s arguments against the ‘myth of the given’ are incompatible with Quine’s rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction.



How to cite
APA: Brandt, S. (2016). Sellars and Quine on Empiricism and Conceptual Truth. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2016.1225566

MLA: Brandt, Stefan. "Sellars and Quine on Empiricism and Conceptual Truth." British Journal for the History of Philosophy (2016).

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