Local Public Goods, Heterogenous Population, Voluntary Transfers, and Constrained Efficient Allocations

Wrede M (1997)


Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 1997

Journal

Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)

Book Volume: 31

Pages Range: 217-234

DOI: 10.1007/s001680050046

Abstract

The underprovision of public goods and the inefficiency of the migration equilibrium in a federation are widely discussed in the fiscal externality literature. The central authority can solve these problems by using inter-regional transfers. Moreover, it has been shown that an intervention of the central government is not necessary when the individuals are identical
with respect to their marginal rate of substitution of private for public goods since local authorities will make efficient transfers to other regions by themselves. This paper, however, shows that an efficient population distribution in a federation is not guaranteed if individuals differ with respect to their marginal benefit from public consumption even if communities
make transfers. The paper also demonstrates the importance of the preference revelation by the residence choice.

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How to cite

APA:

Wrede, M. (1997). Local Public Goods, Heterogenous Population, Voluntary Transfers, and Constrained Efficient Allocations. The annals of regional science, 31, 217-234. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001680050046

MLA:

Wrede, Matthias. "Local Public Goods, Heterogenous Population, Voluntary Transfers, and Constrained Efficient Allocations." The annals of regional science 31 (1997): 217-234.

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