Journal article


Local Public Goods, Heterogenous Population, Voluntary Transfers, and Constrained Efficient Allocations


Publication Details
Author(s): Wrede M
Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Publication year: 1997
Volume: 31
Pages range: 217-234
ISSN: 0570-1864
eISSN: 1432-0592
Language: English

Abstract

The underprovision of public goods and the inefficiency of the migration equilibrium in a federation are widely discussed in the fiscal externality literature. The central authority can solve these problems by using inter-regional transfers. Moreover, it has been shown that an intervention of the central government is not necessary when the individuals are identical
with respect to their marginal rate of substitution of private for public goods since local authorities will make efficient transfers to other regions by themselves. This paper, however, shows that an efficient population distribution in a federation is not guaranteed if individuals differ with respect to their marginal benefit from public consumption even if communities
make transfers. The paper also demonstrates the importance of the preference revelation by the residence choice.



How to cite
APA: Wrede, M. (1997). Local Public Goods, Heterogenous Population, Voluntary Transfers, and Constrained Efficient Allocations. The annals of regional science, 31, 217-234. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001680050046

MLA: Wrede, Matthias. "Local Public Goods, Heterogenous Population, Voluntary Transfers, and Constrained Efficient Allocations." The annals of regional science 31 (1997): 217-234.

BibTeX: Download
Share link
Last updated on 2017-09-21 at 03:01
PDF downloaded successfully