Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany

Dwenger N, Kleven H, Rasul I, Rincke J (2016)


Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2016

Journal

Publisher: American Economic Association

Book Volume: 8

Pages Range: 203-232

Journal Issue: 3

DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150083

Abstract

We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system has historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deterrence baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treatments to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is substantial, that a significant fraction of it may be driven by duty-to-comply preferences, and that there is no crowd-out between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.

Authors with CRIS profile

Involved external institutions

How to cite

APA:

Dwenger, N., Kleven, H., Rasul, I., & Rincke, J. (2016). Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8(3), 203-232. https://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150083

MLA:

Dwenger, Nadja, et al. "Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8.3 (2016): 203-232.

BibTeX: Download