Kietzmann C (2022)
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2022
DOI: 10.1111/phin.12362
Donald Davidson established causalism, i.e. the view that reasons are causes and that action explanation is causal explanation, as the dominant view within contemporary action theory. According to his “master argument”, we must distinguish between reasons the agent merely has and reasons she has and which actually explain what she did, and the only, or at any rate the best, way to make the distinction is by saying that the reasons for which an agent acts are causes of her action. “Davidson's challenge” to non-causalists is to come up with an alternative, more convincing, way of drawing the distinction. In this paper, I argue that G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright offer such an alternative. Moreover, I argue that Davidson's own account of interpretation makes no use of his causalist claim.
APA:
Kietzmann, C. (2022). Anscombe's and von Wright's non-causalist response to Davidson's challenge. Philosophical Investigations. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12362
MLA:
Kietzmann, Christian. "Anscombe's and von Wright's non-causalist response to Davidson's challenge." Philosophical Investigations (2022).
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