How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree

Watzinger M, Fackler T, Nagler M, Schnitzer M (2020)

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2020

Journal

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy American Economic Association

Book Volume: 12

Pages Range: 328-359

Journal Issue: 4

DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190086

Authors with CRIS profile

Markus Nagler Professur für Arbeitsmarkt- und Innovationsökonomik

Involved external institutions

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) DE Germany (DE)

How to cite

APA:

Watzinger, M., Fackler, T., Nagler, M., & Schnitzer, M. (2020). How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12(4), 328-359. https://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20190086

MLA:

Watzinger, Martin, et al. "How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 12.4 (2020): 328-359.

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