Hummel P (2019)
Publication Language: English
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2019
Book Volume: 5
Pages Range: 71-84
Journal Issue: 1
DOI: 10.14275/2465-2334/20199.hum
Open Access Link: https://www.argumenta.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/4-Argumenta-51-Patrik-Hummel-Survival-by-Redescription.pdf
Parfit argues that if we come to believe his theory of personal identity, we should care differently about the future. Amongst others, we can redescribe death in ways that makeitseem less bad. I consider three challenges to his reasoning.First, according to the Argument from Above, a fact, event, or state of affairs can be good or bad independently of the value or disvalueof its constituents. Death could thus be bad even if R-relatedness matters andsome degree of it is gets pre-served. Second, I argue that the Extreme Claimand the Moderate Claimsuggest that it is unclear whether what we are left with in Parfit’s pictureis less bad than death. Third, I propose that in light of the foregoing, we might still regard Parfit’s redescription and its suggested effects on our concern as rationally permissible. However, I claim that rational permissibility does not fully deliver upon the promisethat the redescription is also consoling.Despite these challenges, I con-clude that Parfit has given us valuable prompts for reconsidering our attitudes to-wards death. He has setan inspiring example for how philosophical arguments can show us new ways of thinking about ourselvesand our practical concerns.
APA:
Hummel, P. (2019). Survival by Redescription: Parfit on Consolation and Death. Argumenta, 5(1), 71-84. https://dx.doi.org/10.14275/2465-2334/20199.hum
MLA:
Hummel, Patrik. "Survival by Redescription: Parfit on Consolation and Death." Argumenta 5.1 (2019): 71-84.
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