WLAN Service Providers' Price Competition with Uncertainty in User Demand

Kumar A, Mallik RK, Schober R (2013)

Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2013

Journal

IEEE Communications Letters Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

Book Volume: 17

Pages Range: 517-520

Journal Issue: 3

DOI: 10.1109/LCOMM.2013.020513.122647

Abstract

In this letter, uncertainty in users' network selection is modeled by a Markov chain. In the presence of such uncertainty, the price competition game of wireless local area network (WLAN) service providers (SPs) is analyzed and the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is proved. Using the price of anarchy as a metric of efficiency for social welfare maximization, it is shown that an increase in competition does not result in significant losses in efficiency. Compared to a monopoly, an unregulated duopoly of WLAN SPs is recommended as it results in a more equitable distribution of surplus amongst the SPs and the users.

Authors with CRIS profile

Robert Schober Lehrstuhl für Digitale Übertragung

Involved external institutions

Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Delhi IN India (IN) University of Waterloo (UW) CA Canada (CA)

How to cite

APA:

Kumar, A., Mallik, R.K., & Schober, R. (2013). WLAN Service Providers' Price Competition with Uncertainty in User Demand. IEEE Communications Letters, 17(3), 517-520. https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LCOMM.2013.020513.122647

MLA:

Kumar, Abhinav, Ranjan K. Mallik, and Robert Schober. "WLAN Service Providers' Price Competition with Uncertainty in User Demand." IEEE Communications Letters 17.3 (2013): 517-520.

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