Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games?

Zhou X, Choo L (2022)

Publication Language: English

Publication Status: In press

Publication Type: Journal article, Original article

Future Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2022

Journal

European Economic Review Elsevier

Publisher: Elsevier

City/Town: European Economic Review

Book Volume: 141

Article Number: 103958

Journal Issue: 103958

URI: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0014292121002464

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103958

Abstract

We use an experiment to study whether market selection can reduce anomalous behaviour in games. In different treatments, we employ two alternative mechanisms, the random mechanism and the auction mechanism, to allocate the participation rights to the red hat puzzle game, a well-known logical reasoning problem. Compared to the random mechanism, the auction mechanism significantly reduces deviations from the equilibrium play in the red hat puzzle game. Our findings show that under carefully designed incentives, market competition can indeed reduce anomalous behaviour in games.

Authors with CRIS profile

Xiaoyu Zhou Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie

Involved external institutions

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) / 西南财经大学 CN China (CN)

How to cite

APA:

Zhou, X., & Choo, L. (2022). Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games? European Economic Review, 141(103958). https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103958

MLA:

Zhou, Xiaoyu, and Lawrence Choo. "Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games?" European Economic Review 141.103958 (2022).

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