Rent extraction and prosocial behavior

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Cagala T, Glogowsky U, Grimm V, Rincke J, Tuset Cueva A
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publication year: 2019
ISSN: 0167-2681


Abstract

We present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving to non-profit associations. Holding the price of giving constant, we compare contributions between two conditions: a rent extraction condition, in which an administrator can expropriate a part of the contributions and a control condition without rent extraction. We find that rent extraction strongly reduces average contributions. Studying the channels through which this effect operates, we demonstrate that rent extraction has situational spillovers, suggesting that it undermines the contributors’ general preference for giving. In contrast, we do not find evidence for negative reciprocity towards the administrator.


FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
Rincke, Johannes Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Tuset Cueva, Amanda
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik


External institutions with authors

Deutsche Bundesbank
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU)


How to cite

APA:
Cagala, T., Glogowsky, U., Grimm, V., Rincke, J., & Tuset Cueva, A. (2019). Rent extraction and prosocial behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.008

MLA:
Cagala, Tobias, et al. "Rent extraction and prosocial behavior." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2019).

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2019-03-09 at 16:23