Kietzmann C (2018)
Publication Type: Journal article, Original article
Publication year: 2018
Book Volume: 31
Pages Range: 294-302
Journal Issue: 3
DOI: 10.1111/rati.12195
It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rulefollowing, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking-belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one’s reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.
APA:
Kietzmann, C. (2018). Inference and the taking condition. Ratio, 31(3), 294-302. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12195
MLA:
Kietzmann, Christian. "Inference and the taking condition." Ratio 31.3 (2018): 294-302.
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