Cagala T, Glogowsky U, Grimm V, Rincke J, Tuset Cueva A (2019)
Publication Language: English
Publication Status: Accepted
Publication Type: Journal article
Future Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2019
Pages Range: 709-723
Journal Issue: 166
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.008
Open Access Link: http://www.wirtschaftspolitik.rw.uni-erlangen.de/research/ptx_2019_08_07.pdf
We present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving
to non-profit associations. Holding the price of giving constant, we compare contributions between
two conditions: a rent-extraction condition, in which an administrator can expropriate a part of the
contributions and a control condition without rent extraction. We find that rent extraction strongly
reduces average contributions. Studying the channels through which this effect operates, we demonstrate that rent extraction has situational spillovers, suggesting that it undermines the contributors’
general preference for giving. In contrast, we do not find evidence for negative reciprocity towards the
administrator.
APA:
Cagala, T., Glogowsky, U., Grimm, V., Rincke, J., & Tuset Cueva, A. (2019). Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 166, 709-723. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.008
MLA:
Cagala, Tobias, et al. "Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 166 (2019): 709-723.
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