Kietzmann C (2019)
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2019
Book Volume: 27
Pages Range: 426-440
Journal Issue: 2
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12407
Cognitivists think that intention necessarily involves belief; noncognitivists deny this claim. I argue that both sides of the debate have so far overlooked that the beliefs involved in intention are first-personal beliefs and therefore relevantly different from ordinary beliefs that stand in need of justification through evidence. This move substantially changes the cognitivist thesis, and in such a way that the noncognitivist objections can be avoided. In Section 2, I lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. Section 3 discusses and dismisses Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I introduce the distinction between “ordinary” and “first-personal beliefs.” In Section 5, I argue that intention invariably involves a first-personal belief that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal answers them.
APA:
Kietzmann, C. (2019). Does intention involve belief? European Journal of Philosophy, 27(2), 426-440. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12407
MLA:
Kietzmann, Christian. "Does intention involve belief?" European Journal of Philosophy 27.2 (2019): 426-440.
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