Efficient Invisible and Unlinkable Sanitizable Signatures

Beitrag in einem Sammelwerk


Details zur Publikation

Autorinnen und Autoren: Bultel X, Lafourcade P, Lai RWF, Malavolta G, Schröder D, Thyagarajan SAK
Herausgeber: Dongdai Lin, Kazue Sako
Titel Sammelwerk: Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2019 - 22nd IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, Proceedings
Verlag: Springer Verlag
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2019
Titel der Reihe: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Band: 11442 LNCS
Seitenbereich: 159-189
ISSN: 0302-9743


Abstract

Sanitizable signatures allow designated parties (the sanitizers) to apply arbitrary modifications to some restricted parts of signed messages. A secure scheme should not only be unforgeable, but also protect privacy and hold both the signer and the sanitizer accountable. Two important security properties that are seemingly difficult to achieve simultaneously and efficiently are invisibility and unlinkability. While invisibility ensures that the admissible modifications are hidden from external parties, unlinkability says that sanitized signatures cannot be linked to their sources. Achieving both properties simultaneously is crucial for applications where sensitive personal data is signed with respect to data-dependent admissible modifications. The existence of an efficient construction achieving both properties was recently posed as an open question by Camenisch et al. (PKC’17). In this work, we propose a solution to this problem with a two-step construction. First, we construct (non-accountable) invisible and unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures on equivalence classes and other basic primitives. Second, we put forth a generic transformation using verifiable ring signatures to turn any non-accountable sanitizable signature into an accountable one while preserving all other properties. When instantiating in the generic group and random oracle model, the efficiency of our construction is comparable to that of prior constructions, while providing stronger security guarantees.


FAU-Autorinnen und Autoren / FAU-Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber

Lai, Russell W. F.
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 13 (Angewandte Kryptographie)
Malavolta, Giulio
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 13 (Angewandte Kryptographie)
Schröder, Dominique Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 13 (Angewandte Kryptographie)
Thyagarajan, Sri Aravinda Krishnan
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 13 (Angewandte Kryptographie)


Einrichtungen weiterer Autorinnen und Autoren

Université d'Auvergne Clermont-Ferrand I / University of Auvergne
Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier


Zitierweisen

APA:
Bultel, X., Lafourcade, P., Lai, R.W.F., Malavolta, G., Schröder, D., & Thyagarajan, S.A.K. (2019). Efficient Invisible and Unlinkable Sanitizable Signatures. In Dongdai Lin, Kazue Sako (Eds.), Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2019 - 22nd IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, Proceedings. (pp. 159-189). Springer Verlag.

MLA:
Bultel, Xavier, et al. "Efficient Invisible and Unlinkable Sanitizable Signatures." Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2019 - 22nd IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, Proceedings. Ed. Dongdai Lin, Kazue Sako, Springer Verlag, 2019. 159-189.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2019-15-05 um 10:23