FOSTERING THE BEST EXECUTION REGIME: AN EXPERIMENT ABOUT PECUNIARY SANCTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN FIDUCIARY MONEY MANAGEMENT

Journal article


Publication Details

Author(s): Casal S, Ploner M, Sproten A
Journal: Economic Inquiry
Publication year: 2019
Volume: 57
Journal issue: 1
Pages range: 600-616
ISSN: 0095-2583


Abstract

Asset management often involves a conflict of interests between investors and fund managers. A main goal of financial regulators is to identify and mitigate this conflict. This article focuses on measures that may foster protection of investors' interests. In an experiment capturing the essential elements of asset management, we find that managers' accountability does not prevent their opportunistic behavior if not backed by a threat of punishment. Further, investors inefficiently sanction managers if not completely aware of managers' choices. To effectively protect investors in financial intermediations, financial regulators should ensure both managers' accountability and a credible sanctioning system.


FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Sproten, Alec Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


External institutions with authors

Università degli studi di Milano
Università degli Studi di Trento


How to cite

APA:
Casal, S., Ploner, M., & Sproten, A. (2019). FOSTERING THE BEST EXECUTION REGIME: AN EXPERIMENT ABOUT PECUNIARY SANCTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN FIDUCIARY MONEY MANAGEMENT. Economic Inquiry, 57(1), 600-616. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12575

MLA:
Casal, Sandro, Matteo Ploner, and Alec Sproten. "FOSTERING THE BEST EXECUTION REGIME: AN EXPERIMENT ABOUT PECUNIARY SANCTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN FIDUCIARY MONEY MANAGEMENT." Economic Inquiry 57.1 (2019): 600-616.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2019-07-05 at 11:08