Is it good to be too light? Birth weight thresholds in hospital reimbursement systems

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift


Details zur Publikation

Autor(en): Reif S, Wichert S, Wuppermann A
Zeitschrift: Journal of Health Economics
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2018
ISSN: 0167-6296
Sprache: Englisch


Abstract

Birth weight manipulation has been documented in per-case hospital
reimbursement systems, in which hospitals receive more money for
otherwise equal newborns with birth weight just below compared to just
above specific birth weight thresholds. As hospitals receive more money
for cases with weight below the thresholds, having a (reported) weight
below a threshold could benefit the newborn. Also, these reimbursement
thresholds overlap with diagnostic thresholds that have been shown to
affect the quantity and quality of care that newborns receive. Based on
the universe of hospital births
in Germany from the years 2005–2011, we investigate whether weight
below reimbursement relevant thresholds triggers different quantity and
quality of care. We find that this is not the case, suggesting that
hospitals’ financial incentives with respect to birth weight do not
directly impact the care that newborns receive.


FAU-Autoren / FAU-Herausgeber

Reif, Simon
Professur für Gesundheitsökonomie


Zitierweisen

APA:
Reif, S., Wichert, S., & Wuppermann, A. (2018). Is it good to be too light? Birth weight thresholds in hospital reimbursement systems. Journal of Health Economics. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.01.007

MLA:
Reif, Simon, S. Wichert, and A. Wuppermann. "Is it good to be too light? Birth weight thresholds in hospital reimbursement systems." Journal of Health Economics (2018).

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-01-12 um 13:53