Information acquisition and revelation in committees: An experimental study, R&R Experimental Economics

Other publication type


Publication Details

Author(s): Großer J, Seebauer M
Publication year: 2018
Language: English


Abstract


We experimentally study compulsory majority voting over two alternatives in small committees. The committee members share a common interest, and each member decides on whether to buy a private signal about which alternative better suits their interest. A signal is valuable but only imperfectly indicates the better alternative. In the experiment, both standing and ad hoc committees perform on average poorly, but the former committees do even worse and have a much higher performance variation than the latter ones. We attribute the low efficiency to limited feedback about the informational efforts of co-members, which impedes coordination and proper evaluation of their intention to cooperate.


FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Seebauer, Michael Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


Research Fields

Laboratory for Experimental Research in Nuremberg (LERN)
Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften


How to cite

APA:
Großer, J., & Seebauer, M. (2018). Information acquisition and revelation in committees: An experimental study, R&R Experimental Economics.

MLA:
Großer, Jens, and Michael Seebauer. Information acquisition and revelation in committees: An experimental study, R&R Experimental Economics. 2018.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2019-27-03 at 16:53