Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift


Details zur Publikation

Autorinnen und Autoren: Wrede M
Zeitschrift: International Tax and Public Finance
Verlag: Springer Verlag (Germany)
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2000
Band: 7
Seitenbereich: 163-175
ISSN: 0927-5940
Sprache: Englisch


Abstract


This paper deals with a specific vertical assignment of public functions in a federation: Two levels of government share both the same tax source and expenditure on a productivity increasing public service. We consider surplus maximizing Leviathan governments which provide public services in order to increase their potential tax base. The Nash equilibrium is characterized by overtaxation and relative to surplus maximization—depending on whether or not the public goods are sufficiently complementary with the entire tax base—either  underprovision or overprovision of the public service. The implications of these results, in terms of welfare and potential use for earmarking taxes are also considered.



FAU-Autorinnen und Autoren / FAU-Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber

Wrede, Matthias Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Sozialpolitik


Zitierweisen

APA:
Wrede, M. (2000). Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures. International Tax and Public Finance, 7, 163-175. https://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008752403978

MLA:
Wrede, Matthias. "Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures." International Tax and Public Finance 7 (2000): 163-175.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-17-10 um 13:00