Security of Blind Signatures Revisited

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift
(Originalarbeit)


Details zur Publikation

Autorinnen und Autoren: Schröder D, Unruh D
Zeitschrift: Journal of Cryptology
Verlag: Springer New York LLC
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2017
Band: 30
Heftnummer: 2
Seitenbereich: 470-494
ISSN: 1432-1378
Sprache: Englisch


Abstract


We revisit the security definitions of blind signatures as proposed by Pointcheval and Stern (J Cryptol 13(3):361–396, 2000). Security comprises the notions of one-more unforgeability, preventing a malicious user to generate more signatures than requested, and of blindness, averting a malicious signer to learn useful information about the user’s messages. Although this definition is well established nowadays, we show that there are still desirable security properties that fall outside of the model. More precisely, in the original unforgeability definition is not excluded that an adversary verifiably uses the same message m for signing twice and is then still able to produce another signature for a new message m≠ m. Intuitively, this should not be possible; yet, it is not captured in the original definition, because the number of signatures equals the number of requests. We thus propose a stronger notion, called honest-user unforgeability, that covers these attacks. We give a simple and efficient transformation that turns any unforgeable blind signature scheme (with deterministic verification) into an honest-user unforgeable one.



FAU-Autorinnen und Autoren / FAU-Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber

Schröder, Dominique Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 13 (Angewandte Kryptographie)


Zitierweisen

APA:
Schröder, D., & Unruh, D. (2017). Security of Blind Signatures Revisited. Journal of Cryptology, 30(2), 470-494. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00145-015-9225-1

MLA:
Schröder, Dominique, and Dominique Unruh. "Security of Blind Signatures Revisited." Journal of Cryptology 30.2 (2017): 470-494.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-08-11 um 13:50