Information Leakage behind the Curtain: Abusing Anti-EMI Features for Covert Communication

Beitrag bei einer Tagung
(Originalarbeit)


Details zur Publikation

Autorinnen und Autoren: Bauer J, Schinzel S, Freiling F, Dewald A
Titel Sammelwerk: Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2016
Verlag: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2016
Tagungsband: Proceedings of HOST 2016
Seitenbereich: 130-134
ISBN: 9781467388252
Sprache: Englisch


Abstract

We present a new class of covert channels which can be created by utilizing common hardware but that cannot be detected by such. Our idea is to abuse anti-EMI features of a processor to create a covert channel on the physical layer. Thus, the sender uses the invariants in how digital signals are encoded over analog channels to covertly transport information. This leaked data is present on the wire bound connections of the compromised device, but is also by definition present in the vicinity of the device and can be picked up by radio equipment. As the covert channel is present only on the physical layer, the data on all layers above, as well as the timing behavior on those layers is indistinguishable from uncompromised devices.


FAU-Autorinnen und Autoren / FAU-Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber

Bauer, Johannes
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 1 (IT-Sicherheitsinfrastrukturen)
Dewald, Andreas Dr.-Ing.
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 1 (IT-Sicherheitsinfrastrukturen)
Freiling, Felix Prof. Dr.-Ing.
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 1 (IT-Sicherheitsinfrastrukturen)
Schinzel, Sebastian Prof. Dr.-Ing.
Lehrstuhl für Informatik 1 (IT-Sicherheitsinfrastrukturen)


Zitierweisen

APA:
Bauer, J., Schinzel, S., Freiling, F., & Dewald, A. (2016). Information Leakage behind the Curtain: Abusing Anti-EMI Features for Covert Communication. In Proceedings of HOST 2016 (pp. 130-134). McLean, VA, USA: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc..

MLA:
Bauer, Johannes, et al. "Information Leakage behind the Curtain: Abusing Anti-EMI Features for Covert Communication." Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, McLean, VA, USA Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. 130-134.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2019-15-05 um 20:23