Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games

Doll M, Seebauer M, Tonn M (2017)


Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Other publication type

Publication year: 2017

Series: FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 15/2017

URI: https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/167685

Abstract

We implement waiting time as a currency in an ultimatum game in an experimental laboratory study. Subjects had to split 60 minutes of waiting time. We analyze bargaining behavior in varying situations connected to waiting time as well as gain and loss framing. Different situations that follow waiting time have no influence on bargaining behavior. Regarding gain and loss framing, we do not find dierences in proposers' behavior. Responders show less willingness to wait when the bargaining outcome is framed as a loss compared to being framed as a gain of time. Displaying less willingness to wait, responders show a higher propensity to risk a rejection of the proposers' offers.

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How to cite

APA:

Doll, M., Seebauer, M., & Tonn, M. (2017). Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games.

MLA:

Doll, Monika, Michael Seebauer, and Maren Tonn. Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games. 2017.

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