Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games

Other publication type


Publication Details

Author(s): Doll M, Seebauer M, Tonn M
Publication year: 2017
Title of series: FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 15/2017
Language: English


Abstract


We implement waiting time as a currency in an ultimatum game in an experimental laboratory study. Subjects had to split 60 minutes of waiting time. We analyze bargaining behavior in varying situations connected to waiting time as well as gain and loss framing. Different situations that follow waiting time have no influence on bargaining behavior. Regarding gain and loss framing, we do not find dierences in proposers' behavior. Responders show less willingness to wait when the bargaining outcome is framed as a loss compared to being framed as a gain of time. Displaying less willingness to wait, responders show a higher propensity to risk a rejection of the proposers' offers.



FAU Authors / FAU Editors

Doll, Monika
Lehrstuhl für Statistik und Ökonometrie
Seebauer, Michael Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
Tonn, Maren
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie


How to cite

APA:
Doll, M., Seebauer, M., & Tonn, M. (2017). Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games.

MLA:
Doll, Monika, Michael Seebauer, and Maren Tonn. Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games. 2017.

BibTeX: 

Last updated on 2018-10-08 at 21:27