On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift
(Originalarbeit)


Details zur Publikation

Autorinnen und Autoren: Feicht R, Grimm V, Rau H, Stephan G
Zeitschrift: European Economic Review
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2017
Heftnummer: 100
Seitenbereich: 175-192
ISSN: 0014-2921


Abstract


We conduct a novel type of multi-person one-shot game that reflects important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives from one or both groups takes acceptance decisions. In a 2 × 2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii) proposals are balanced only if both groups have veto power, (iii) negotiations often fail if the decision environment gives insufficient guidance on what an appropriate proposal is, and (iv) non-binding communication substantially reduces rejection rates and proposer shares.


FAU-Autorinnen und Autoren / FAU-Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber

Feicht, Robert
Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
Rau, Holger Dr.
Stephan, Gesine Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Empirische Mikroökonomie (Stiftungslehrstuhl)


Forschungsbereiche

Laboratory for Experimental Research in Nuremberg (LERN)
Fachbereich Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften


Zitierweisen

APA:
Feicht, R., Grimm, V., Rau, H., & Stephan, G. (2017). On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining. European Economic Review, 100, 175-192. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.08.004

MLA:
Feicht, Robert, et al. "On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining." European Economic Review 100 (2017): 175-192.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-05-11 um 13:15