Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany

Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift


Details zur Publikation

Autor(en): Büttner T, Schwager R, Hauptmeier S
Zeitschrift: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics - Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft
Verlag: Mohr Siebeck
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2011
Band: 167
Seitenbereich: 647-667
ISSN: 0932-4569


Abstract


This paper explores conditions under which revenue-sharing grants will achieve efficiency. We develop a general formulation of the state's decision problem of implementing a set of local policies. A theoretical analysis shows that if the state government pursues own policies and cannot levy lump-sum contributions from local jurisdictions, it will implement revenue-sharing grants that induce local governments to raise local tax rates. A subsequent empirical analysis of local tax policy in Germany suggests that attempts by state-level governments to extract fiscal resources fromlocal governments result in higher tax rates at the local level. ©2011 Mohr Siebeck.



FAU-Autoren / FAU-Herausgeber

Büttner, Thiess Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Finanzwissenschaft


Autor(en) der externen Einrichtung(en)
Die Europäische Zentralbank / European Central Bank (EZB / ECB)


Zitierweisen

APA:
Büttner, T., Schwager, R., & Hauptmeier, S. (2011). Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics - Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 167, 647-667.

MLA:
Büttner, Thiess, Robert Schwager, and Sebastian Hauptmeier. "Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics - Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 167 (2011): 647-667.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2018-09-08 um 17:23