Overbidding in First Price Private Value Auctions Revisited: Implications of a Multi-Unit Auction Experiment

Engelmann D, Grimm V (2005)

Publication Language: English

Publication Type: Book chapter / Article in edited volumes

Publication year: 2005

Edited Volumes: Advances in Public Economics: Utility, Choice, and Welfare

Series: Theory and Decision Library

Book Volume: 38

Pages Range: 235-254

URI: http://www.springer.com/us/book/9780387257051

DOI: 10.1007/0-387-25706-3_14

Authors with CRIS profile

Veronika Grimm Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie

Involved external institutions

Universität Mannheim DE Germany (DE)

How to cite

APA:

Engelmann, D., & Grimm, V. (2005). Overbidding in First Price Private Value Auctions Revisited: Implications of a Multi-Unit Auction Experiment. In Schmidt U., Traub S. (Eds.), Advances in Public Economics: Utility, Choice, and Welfare. (pp. 235-254).

MLA:

Engelmann, Dirk, and Veronika Grimm. "Overbidding in First Price Private Value Auctions Revisited: Implications of a Multi-Unit Auction Experiment." Advances in Public Economics: Utility, Choice, and Welfare. Ed. Schmidt U., Traub S., 2005. 235-254.

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