Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior

Weiterer Publikationstyp


Details zur Publikation

Autor(en): Cagala T, Glogowsky U, Grimm V, Rincke J, Tuset Cueva A
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2018


Abstract


We present controlled experimental evidence on how corruption affects the private provision of public goods. Subjects in our experiment donate to nonprofit associations. The associations provide local public goods that benefit all subjects. We compare average contributions between two conditions with the same efficiency: a corruption condition, where an administrator can expropriate part of contributions, and a control condition without corruption. Compared to the control condition, subjects matched to an expropriating administrator significantly reduce their contributions. Hence, contributors are less inclined to behave prosocially (i.e. are more likely to free-ride) if they are exposed to corruption. We demonstrate that this effect works through a specific channel: corruption breaks the otherwise positive link between baseline preferences for cooperation and private contributions to public goods.


FAU-Autoren / FAU-Herausgeber

Cagala, Tobias
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Glogowsky, Ulrich
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Grimm, Veronika Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
Rincke, Johannes Prof. Dr.
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik
Tuset Cueva, Amanda
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik


Zitierweisen

APA:
Cagala, T., Glogowsky, U., Grimm, V., Rincke, J., & Tuset Cueva, A. (2018). Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior.

MLA:
Cagala, Tobias, et al. Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior. 2018.

BibTeX: 

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2019-21-02 um 12:38